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Abstract
We provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions on both players preferences and
information that can be certied for a Sender-Receiver game to possess a separating
equilibrium, as well as su¢ cient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be
separating. Accordingly, we generalize Seidmann and Winters [D.J. Seidmann, E.
Winter, Strategic information transmission with veriable messages, Econometrica
65 (1997) 163170] results to games with partial provability.
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1. Introduction
Consider a Sender-Receiver message game: viz. costless, non-binding, face-
to-face and one-step unilateral communication game played by an informed
interested party (Sender) who sends a message on the basis of his payo¤-
relevant information to a decision maker (Receiver) who then takes an action.
When the set of Senders available messages vary with his information, we say
that some information is certiable. 1 What conditions on playerspreferences
and certiability are required for the Sender to voluntary reveal his private
information to the Receiver ? Said di¤erently, what conditions on players
Email address: jerome.mathis@TSE-fr.eu (Jérôme Mathis).
1 In this paper, the term certiable is equivalent to the terms provable and
veriable. See subsection 2.2 for a formal denition.
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preferences and message structure are necessary and/or su¢ cient for such a
game to possess a separating equilibrium ?
The literature has addressed this question only for some specic certiability
contexts.
In cheap-talk games the informed party can certify nothing of what he knows
(formally, the message space does not depend on the realized type). In such a
game, when the Receivers ideal action (when fully informed) is unique in the
Senders type (e.g., Crawford and Sobel [5]), full revelation occurs if and only
if no Senders type strictly prefers to be misidentied for another. 2
When the Sender has the ability to certify both all his payo¤-relevant infor-
mation as well as the fact that he is not withholding information (formally,
by sending a particular message unavailable to any other type), Milgrom [18],
Grossman [12] and Grossman and Hart [13] have shown that under monotonic
preferences 3 all information is revealed in every equilibrium. Existence of
such an outcome requires the possibility for the Receiver to use a skeptical (or
worst case) inference (i.e., to identify what is the least favorable information
for the Sender, and to believe it when he detects or suspects that the Sender
withholds piece of information). Seidmann and Winter [21] generalize these
existence and uniqueness results by replacing monotonicity with preferences
where both playersideal action strictly increases with the Senders type, and
the bias (i.e., the di¤erence between the two playersideal actions) either is
strictly one-signed in the Senders type (e.g., Crawford and Sobel [5] 4 ) or
changes in the wrong direction. They also give a single-crossing property on
more general preferences that guarantees the existence of a separating equi-
librium.
Giovannoni and Seidmann [11] study a Sender-Receiver game where the certi-
ability is stronger: the Sender has the ability to prove any true event (formally,
the Sender can certify all subset of types containing the realized one). They
show that such a game possesses a separating equilibrium if and only if no
pair of types strictly prefer to be misidentied for another (Giovannoni and
2 Forges [7] is an example of cheap-talk game satisfying this condition and then
possessing a separating equilibrium although players have conicting preferences.
Forges-Koessler ([9], Example 7) is an example of cheap-talk game failing this con-
dition but even so possessing a separating equilibrium (in mixed strategy) because
the Receivers ideal action is not unique in the Senders type.
3 That is, each Senders type wants the Receiver to believe that his type is as high
(or as low) as possible. More precisely, the Receivers optimal action increases with
the Senders type, and each Senders type payo¤ is monotonic in the Receivers
action.
4 The one-signedness follows from their continuity assumption and their premise of
Theorem 1.
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Seidmanns single-crossing property).
While it seems reasonable to consider situations in which an informed agent
can certify something, it is often unrealistic to assume that he has the ability
to certify everything. The information transmission may be limited by time or
technical constraints, the Receivers ability to verify a proof, or the Senders
ability to prove all true payo¤-relevant facts or that he is not withholding
others information. Accordingly, we generalize Seidmann and Winters [21]
results to a setting of certiability that may be partial.
In a context of partial certiability, Lipman and Seppi [16] provide necessary
and su¢ cient conditions under which full revelation takes place when there
are multiple informed agents. They show that the Receiver can extract the
information by adopting an inference rule that consists in believing any claim
reported by a Sender unless refuted by another. The revelation relies on a
competition between Senders with conicting preferences and cannot apply
with only one Sender.
We provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions on both playerspreferences and
information that can be certied for the existence of a separating equilibrium.
These conditions (Proposition 1) are rst that every set of types that can
be certied has a worst case inference (Seidmann and Winters [21] result).
And second that every type can separate from all types that strictly prefer to
be misidentied as him. For preferences where the bias either is strictly one-
signed in the Senders type (as monotonic preferences) or changes in the wrong
direction, we provide conditions on certiability that ensures existence and
uniqueness of the separating equilibrium outcome. The existence condition is
that every type can certify that it is at least as high (resp. as low) as it actually
is when the Senders ideal action exceeds (resp. is exceeded by) the Receivers
one. This holds even when contrary to Seidmann and Winter [21], the Senders
ideal action does not increase with the Senders type (Theorem 1). Uniqueness
is guaranteed under the stronger condition that every type can certify a set
only containing types for which it prefers to be misidentied (Theorem 2). This
last condition also ensures existence of a separating equilibrium under more
general preferences satisfying Seidmann and Winters [21] or Giovannoni and
Seidmanns [11] single-crossing property (Theorem 3). Finally, we illustrate
the use of our three theorems in an example.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our model describing
the general framework and some preliminary denitions. Results, example and
applications are o¤ered in Section 3. All proofs have been relegated to an
appendix at the end of the paper.
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2. Model
A persuasion game,  , is played by a Sender, S, who sends a message on
the basis of his private information to a Receiver, R, who chooses an action
after observing the message sent by S. Following Seidmann and Winter [21],
hereafter referred to as SW, we denote Rs action space by A with generic
element a. We assume this action setA is a compact interval inR. The Senders
private information or Senders type, t, is realized from a compact interval
  R, with prior distribution p(t). Each players payo¤depends on Rs action
and Ss type. We denote player is state dependent payo¤ function, i = R;S,
by ui(a; t) where ui(; t) is vN-M utility function for each type t 2  .
2.1. Preferences
We shall assume throughout that:
A1. Receiver Preferences: For each t 2  , uR(; t) is concave in a, and
aR(t) := argmaxa2A uR(a; t) is unique. Furthermore, aR() is continuous and
increasing in t on  .
A2. Sender Preferences: For each t 2  , uS(; t) is strictly concave in a,
and aS(t) := argmaxa2A uS(a; t) is unique. Furthermore, aS() is continuous
in t on  .
In A1 and A2, the action ai(t) 2 A denotes the unique maximand of ui(; t)
on A, referring to is ideal action. 5
2.2. Messages and certiability
The keystone of our analysis is that, contrary to SWwe consider a certiability
structure which may be partial. That is, S may be able to certify part of his
information to R, but unable to certify all of the payo¤-relevant information he
actually knows. For instance, an expert may present some certied documents
(as prots earned, initial endowments, costs, physical proofs) supporting part
of his private information to a decision maker, but even by transmitting all
5 A1 is exactly the same Rs preferences assumptions as in SW. In addition to A2,
SWs assumptions on Ss preferences requires that aS() is (a C1 function being)
strictly increasing in t.
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the documents he has, he cannot prove that he is not withholding additional
documents.
An intrinsic certiability structure requires that the set of available messages
depends on Ss private information. We assume the set of available messages
may be type-dependent (persuasion game). Let M(t) be the nonempty set
of available messages to type t. Let M() := [t2M(t) be the whole set of
messages with generic element m, and M be the messages structure (that
dene which information can be certied) dened as the Cartesian product of
the set of available messages on the set of types, i.e. M := 
t2M(t). This
structure thus denes the messages intrinsic certiability and is dened by
the communication medium (presentation of documents, certied information,
etc...) between both parties. Let T (m) := ft 2  jm 2M(t)g be the set of types
t for which the message m is available. Thus, a message m certies that the
realized type is in T (m) and rules out types in nT (m). We shall equivalently
say that message m veries, certiesor provesthe set T (m). A set T is
veriable, certiableor provable if there is a message m that certies
T . We suppose that each certiable set is closed. Write the game  (M) as
fM;A; p; uR; uSg. 6
2.3. Solution concept and denitions
2.3.1. Solution concept
We shall analyze the pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria of  (M), which
we refer to as its equilibria. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is particularly well
adapted to our situation where a message can intrinsically carry some infor-
mation on the realized type. In addition to Nash equilibrium it requires that R
cannot ignore a proof or evidence transmitted by S. More precisely, on receipt
of any message m (either on or o¤ the equilibrium path) Rs updated belief
must have support in T (m) the set of types for which m is available.
Our main objective is to characterize conditions which ensure the existence of
an equilibrium in which all Ss private information is revealed to R. We shall
say that an equilibrium is fully revealing or separating if there is no identical
6  (M) can be thought of as many signaling game in which payo¤s do not depend
directly on messages. Crawford and Sobel [5] is an example of  (M) where only 
can be certied (cheap-talk game), ui(; t) is strictly concave in a, and ai() is C1 and
strictly increasing in t (in their example, aS(t) = aR(t) + b with b 2 R). Seidmann
and Winter [21] is an example of  (M) where each t 2  is certiable and aS() is
C1 and strictly increasing in t. Giovannoni and Seidmann [11] consider a S-R game
of persuasion where  is nite, every T   is certiable, aR() is strictly increasing
in t and ui(; t) is single-peaked in a.
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message sent by two di¤erent types, so R always learns the true type and
chooses aR(t) in response to each message transmitted by t, for every t 2  .
We shall denote Tmin as min(t 2 T ) and Tmax as max(t 2 T ) for closed T .
2.3.2. Denitions
Under a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, A1 implies that when receiving a mes-
sage certifying a set T , R responds by choosing an action aR(t), where t can
be chosen as an element of the convex hull of T , denoted as co(T ). We shall
say such a type t is an inference for T .
Existence of a separating equilibrium requires that R plays a strategy giving
S the incentive to reveal all his private information. To put such incentive
in place, R must respond to each message available to type t, by an action
getting to t a lower payo¤ than under action aR(t). Said di¤erently, having
observed a message m, R must threaten S with an action a getting to type t,
for any t 2 T (m), a lower payo¤ than under action aR(t). For this threat to
be credible, it requires that action a can be supported by a rational inference.
Such an inference is then called a skeptical inference or a worst case inference
(wci). Formally, an inference t 2 co(T ) is said to be a worst case inference
for T (henceforth t 2 wci(T )) if for all t 2 T
uS(aR(t); t)  uS(aR(t); t)
If t 2 wci(T ) and t 2 T then t is said to be a worst case type for T (wct(T )).
3. Results
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 3.1 provides necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for the game to possess separating equilibrium. Section
3.2 uses these preliminary results to establish more tractable su¢ cient condi-
tions when the game satises a given class of preferences that has been widely
studied in the literature. For such preferences, Section 3.3 o¤ers su¢ cient con-
ditions for every equilibrium to be separating. Section 3.4 provides su¢ cient
conditions for separation under a more general class of preferences. Finally,
Section 3.5 illustrates the use of all our results by an example.
3.1. Preliminary results
Under A1, by denition, if a certiable set T has no wci then whatever Rs
inference t for T , there is a type t 2 T who strictly prefers aR(t) rather
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than aR(t). The existence of a separating equilibrium under A1 then requires
that every certiable set has a wci. When every type is certiable, SW has
shown that this condition is also su¢ cient. Indeed, the separating strategies
in which each type t sends his self-identifying message m (i:e:; such that
T (m) = ftg) and R chooses an ideal action supported by a wci for each
certied set constitutes an equilibrium.
When dropping SWs assumption that every type is certiable, even so full
revelation may occur at equilibrium. For instance, consider a cheap-talk game
of pure common-interest (aS(t) = aR(t) for every t) with more messages than
types. However, the wci condition may not be su¢ cient to guarantee existence
of a separating equilibrium. For instance, in Crawford and Sobels [5] example
only  is certiable and min is a wct for  .
The existence of a separating equilibrium does not require that every type
t can separate from all other types, but only from types that strictly prefer
to be misidentied as type t. In other words, it does not require that each
type t can send a self-identifying message certifying the set T = ftg, but only
that t can certify a set for which he is a wct. If each type is a wct for the
set his separating message certies then no type has an incentive to deviate
to messages on the equilibrium path. To ensure no protable deviation to
messages o¤ the equilibrium path R must threaten by inferring a wci for any
certied set.
The following proposition states that under A1,  (M) possess separating equi-
librium if and only if, roughly speaking: (i) R can play in a manner that every
type t prefers the action aR(t) rather than any action induced by one of his
available message; and (ii) every type t can separate from types that strictly
prefer to be misidentied as type t.
Proposition 1. If A1, then  (M) possesses a separating equilibrium if and
only if:
(i) Every certiable set has a wci; and
(ii) Every type can certify (with a di¤erent message) a set for which he is a
wct.
Condition (i) in Proposition 1 is the SWs necessary and su¢ cient condition
for the existence of a separating equilibrium in games where every type is
certiable. This condition obviously holds if Ss preferences are monotonic in
Rs action (e.g., Fishman and Hagerty [8], Grossman [12], Grossman and Hart
[13], Koessler [14], Matthews and Postlewaite [17], Milgrom [18], Milgrom and
Roberts [19], Shin [22,23]), as for any certiable set T either Tmin or Tmax is
a wct.
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Condition (ii) in Proposition 1 says that any type tmust be able to send a mes-
sage that certies a set not containing a type t0 who would prefer aR(t) rather
than aR(t0). Of course, separation requires that such a message can be cho-
sen di¤erently for any type. This condition always holds in persuasion games
where every type t 2  is certiable (e.g., Giovannoni and Seidmann [11],
Grossman [12], Grossman and Hart [13], Koessler [14], Matthews and Postle-
waite [17], Milgrom [18], Milgrom and Roberts [19], Seidmann and Winter
[21]) since it is su¢ cient for type t to send his self-identifying message. Lit-
erature has examples of games where this condition fails. This is the case in
Fishman and Hagerty [8] 7 since there is no enough messages, and Cheap-Talk
games once there is a type that strictly prefers to be misidentied for another
(so this latter type is not a wct for the unique certiable set ). In a situation
where a type possessing more information than another one, can certify all
what this latter can certify, condition (ii) requires that the former does not
strictly prefer to be misidentied as the latter. The failure of this explains the
nonexistence of separating equilibrium in Shin [22,23]. 8
In the following, using Proposition 1 we shall state three theorems providing
su¢ cient conditions for  (M) to possess a separating equilibrium (Theorem
1 and Theorem 3) and su¢ cient conditions for every equilibrium of  (M) to
be separating (Theorem 2). Although the conditions we shall use to imply
condition (i) and (ii) could not be treated independently, roughly speaking
we shall label condition (a) referring to (i) and condition (b) referring to (ii).
That is, condition denoted as (a) will refer to some su¢ cient conditions on
playerspreferences and condition denoted as (b) will refer to some su¢ cient
conditions on the message structure which, contrary to SW, only requires
partial certiability. Condition (a) will be the same in Theorem 1 and Theorem
2. Condition (b) will be the same in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3.
7 They assume that S observes N signals, each taking on one of two values, high
or low, and that S only can certiably disclose the realization of one signal. So,
there are 2N types while there only are 2N available messages.
8 Shin [22] considers two interested parties (a defendant and a plainti¤) whereas
Shin [23] consider only one interested party (a rm) and two decision makers (two
shareholders). Boiling down to an S-R game, he assumes that Ss preferences are
monotonic in Rs action and that R does not know whether S has or not perfectly
observed the payo¤-relevant state (state of Nature), which is a given value in an
interval. He assumes that S observes a randomly chosen interval containing the
state of Nature and that he only can prove a larger interval than the one observed,
but cannot prove that he has not observed a smaller one.
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3.2. Existence
SWs Theorem 1 provides some su¢ cient conditions on  (M) to possess a
separating equilibrium. Our rst theorem generalizes such a result to a partial
certiability setting and more general preferences. Denotes the bias function
B(t) as aR(t)   aS(t). A1 and A2 imply that B() is continuous in t on  .
B is said to change sign on T if there is a closed interval I  T such that
B() is weakly monotonic on I and B(Imin)B(Imax) < 0 (I is said to be a sign-
changing interval). B is said to change sign n times on T if n is the maximum
number of disjoint intervals in T on which B changes sign.
If Ss preferences are monotonic inRs action or players have Crawford and So-
bels [5] preferences then B() does not change sign on  . Consider for instance
that B()  0 on  . In this case, A1 and A2 imply that for every certiable
set T , Tmin is a wci. In the light of Proposition 1, a su¢ cient condition for the
existence of a separating equilibrium is that every type t can certify (with a
di¤erent message) a set for which he is a wct. That is, it su¢ ces that every
type t is able to certify a set T for which Tmin = t. Of course, by substituting
Tmin for Tmax when B()  0 on  we obtain the result. The same reasoning
holds if B() changes sign once on  and B(min) > 0. 9
Theorem 1. If A1 and A2 then  (M) possesses a separating equilibrium if:
(a) B() does not change sign on  , or B() changes sign once on  and
B(min) > 0; and
(b) Every type t can certify (with a di¤erent message) a set T for which
Tmin = t if there is t0 < t such that B(t0) < 0; and Tmax = t if there is t0 > t
such that B(t0) > 0.
Theorem 1 states in particular that in games with monotonic preferences
where every type t 2  is certiable (e.g., Grossman [12], Grossman and
Hart [13], Koessler [14], Matthews and Postlewaite [17], Milgrom [18], Mil-
grom and Roberts [19]) a separating equilibrium would still exist under the
weaker condition that the Sender rather can certify a subset for which his
true type is minimum (resp. maximum) when his ideal action exceeds (resp. is
exceeded by) the Receivers one. The partial certiability of the games studied
9 Example of preferences satisfying this condition is the following. A patient asks
a doctor to diagnose his condition before authorizing him to conduct surgery. Both
agents want more intrusive surgery the worse the patients condition. But the patient
wants more surgery than the doctor would like to perform i¤ he is relatively healthy.
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by Okuno-Fujiwara et al. [20] 10 and Lanzi and Mathis [15] 11 satisfy condition
(b).
In the following, we shall need to identify the set of actions inciting to deviate
from a separating strategy. That is the set of actions getting to type t a higher
payo¤ than under action aR(t). When aR(t) < aS(t) (resp. aR(t) > aS(t)),
write ~a(t) as fa 2 Aja 6= aR(t) and uS(a; t) = uS(aR(t); t)g when a is well-
dened, and ~a(t) = +1 (resp. ~a(t) =  1) otherwise. When aR(t) = aS(t),
write ~a(t) as aR(t). A2 implies that ~a(t) is unique. Notice that if uS(; t) were
symmetric round aS(t) then ~a(t) = 2aS(t)  aR(t).
3.3. Uniqueness
From now, we shall generalize SWs Theorem 3 which provides some su¢ cient
conditions for every equilibrium to be separating. In addition to the premises
of Theorem 1, assume that aR() is strictly increasing in t on  . So for any
certiable set T which is nonsingleton, whenever B() > 0 on T , type Tmin
strictly prefers action aR(Tmin) rather than aR(t) for all t in co(T )nfTming, and
so rather than any Rs equilibrium response to a message certifying a set T . On
the other hand, any Rs equilibrium response to a message m0 that certies
a set T 0 with T 0max = Tmin and a
R(T 0min) > ~a(Tmin), is an action a(m
0) that
gets a higher (or equal) payo¤ to type Tmin, than does action aR(Tmin). So if
type Tmin can certify set T 0, doing so always constitutes a protable unilateral
deviation from certifying set T . A similar reasoning applies with type Tmax
when B() < 0 on T . Thus, Ss equilibrium strategy contains a pooling set of
types sending the same message. Any equilibrium is then separating. As for
Theorem 1, we shall show that the same reasoning holds if B() changes sign
once on  and B(min) > 0.
Theorem 2. Suppose aR() is strictly increasing in t on  . If A1, A2 and:
10 They consider a game with multiple agents. They assume that each agent can
send a message consisting of a set of truthful lower bounds for the signal he has
observed. They show that if agentspayo¤s are positive-monotone in beliefs then
every equilibrium is separating.
11 They consider a situation where R relies on the report of S prior to decide whether
to undertake or not a certain project. The higher is the value of the observed state
the more the state is conveying favorable information sustaining the project. In-
formation contained in the report is partially veriable in the sense that S can
suppress favorable information but he cannot exaggerate it. They assume that con-
icting preferences only occur for medium state values. The ideal playersaction for
such values then identies the more eager agent for the project to be undertaken.
In particular, they show that there is a separating equilibrium if and only if S is
the more eager agent.
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(a) B() does not change sign on  , or B() changes sign once on  and
B(min) > 0; and
(b) Every type t can certify (with a di¤erent message) a set T for which
Tmin = t and aR(Tmax) < ~a(t) if B(t) < 0; T = ftg if B(t) = 0; and Tmax = t
and aR(Tmin) > ~a(t) else,
then every equilibrium of  (M) is separating.
Theorem 2 states in particular that in games where the Sender wants to max-
imize the magnitude of the Receivers action (e.g., Fishman and Hagerty [8],
Grossman [12], Grossman and Hart [13], Koessler [14], Matthews and Postle-
waite [17], Milgrom [18], Milgrom and Roberts [19], Okuno-Fujiwara et al. [20],
Shin [23]), every equilibrium is separating whenever the Sender can certify a
subset for which his true type is minimum (as with such preferences B(t) < 0
then implies ~a(t) = +1).
3.4. Existence under more general preferences
Now, under A1 and A2 we shall provide su¢ cient conditions on  (M) that
guarantee the existence of a separating equilibrium even when playersprefer-
ences may fail the premises of Theorem 1 and 2, but satisfy a single-crossing
property. The single-crossing property we use for a set T excludes the possibil-
ity that T contains any pair of types which strictly prefer to be misidentied
for another. 12 , 13
Single-crossing property for set T . If uS(aR(t1); t1) < uS(aR(t2); t1) for
any pair t1; t2 2 T , then uS(aR(t1); t2)  uS(aR(t2); t2).
Our next result will exploit the fact that if a type t can certify a set T that
both satises the single-crossing property (Theorem 3 condition (a1)) and only
contains types either for which t strictly prefers to be misidentied or for which
Rs ideal action is the same (Theorem 3 condition (b0)), then t is a wct for T .
12 This property for set  is equivalent to the one in Giovannoni-Seidmann [11]
if aR() is strictly increasing in t. The authors show that this is a necessary and
su¢ cient condition for games where every set of types is veriable to possess a
separating equilibrium. Here, when dropping such an assumption on the information
that can be certied, the single-crossing property is obviously no longer necessary
(consider for instance, a game in which one pair of types violates this property but
is unable to certify a common set not containing a wct).
13 It can be showed that this property is implied by SWs single-crossing property
if aS() is strictly increasing in t.
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Rather than assuming the single-property for any pair of types, we only need
to assume it for pair of types who have a common available message (Theorem
3 condition (a1)). (This distinction plays a role only if  is not certiable.) To
establish the proof, we shall use an inductive argument on the number of sign
changing of B() requiring that B() changes sign nitely often on  (Theorem
3 condition (a2)).
Theorem 3. If A1 and A2 then  (M) possesses a separating equilibrium if:
(a1) Every certiable set satises the single-crossing property; and
(a2) B() changes sign nitely often on  ; and
(b) Every type t can certify (with a di¤erent message) a set T for which
Tmin = t and aR(Tmax) < ~a(t) if B(t) < 0; T = ftg if B(t) = 0; and Tmax = t
and aR(Tmin) > ~a(t) else.
Without condition (a2) requiring that B() changes sign nitely often on  ,
our Theorem 3 would be the generalization of the SWs Theorem 2. 14
3.5. Example
 = A = [0; 1];  (M) such that preferences represented by:
uR(a; t) =  [a  t]2;
uS(a; t) =  [a  (+ t)]2;  6= 1;
As uS(; t) is symmetric round aS(t), on A we have ~a(t) := 2aS(t)  aR(t); so
~a(t) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
 1 if + t < t
2
+1 if + t > t+1
2
2+ (2   1)t else
B() has a unique zero at t = 
(1 ) (if t
 =2 (0; 1) then B() does not change
sign on ). If   0 or +   1 then, from Theorem 1, there is a separating
equilibrium if every t can certify (with a di¤erent message) a set T satisfying:
Tmax = t when (1 )t > ; and Tmin = t when (1 )t < . In addition, from
Theorem 2, every equilibrium is separating if t can certify (with a di¤erent
message) a set T satisfying: Tmax = t and Tmin  ~a(t) when (1   )t > ;
T = ftg when t = t; and Tmin = t and Tmax  ~a(t) else. From Theorem
14We can obtain the generalization of SWs Theorem 2 by replacing our single-
crossing property by theirs and restricting our Ss preferences to theirs (that is,
requiring in addition to A2 that aS() is C1 and strictly increasing in t).
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3, this latter condition ensures that there is a separating equilibrium when
 > 0,  +  < 1 and    1 ( <  1 would violate the single-crossing
property for set ). 
3.6. Applications
When an informed agent does not have the ability to certify all his private in-
formation we have shown that full revelation requires an additional condition:
every type can separate from types that prefer to pool with him. This condi-
tion is strong. But the decision-maker (Receiver) may ask the informed party
(Sender) to provide appropriate available documents so that this condition
holds. Here are some applications.
A seller can ask a budget-constrained buyer to post a bond equal to his re-
ported budget in order to prevent him from overstating it (see, e.g., Che
and Gale [4]). Traders in an exchange economy can be required to deposit
collateral for each order preventing them from over-reporting their initial en-
dowments (see, e.g., Forges et al. [10]). Financial reporting companies can be
compelled by legislation (see, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) to annually is-
sue a statement identifying the framework used by management to evaluate the
e¤ectiveness of the companys internal control in order to prevent them from
misleading investors. A court can ask a creditor declaring that a debtor paid
him with a bounced check to present a bank notice stating that the debtors
check was returned due to insu¢ cient funds, otherwise giving weight to neg-
ative evidence (see, e.g., Bull and Watson [2]). Consumers may turn toward
eco-labeled products to prevent both industrial and agricultural sectors from
withholding the environmental externalities associated with their production
process (see, e.g., Cason and Gangadharan [3]). Similarly, investors may turn
toward issues that are underwritten by reputable investment banks to detect
rms that are signicantly less risky (see, e.g., Fang [6]). A rm hoping to
appropriate an innovation may be compelled by the patent granting authority
to present the new technical knowledge it possess (see, e.g., dAspremont et
al. [1]).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Formally, condition (ii) write as: there is an injec-
tion i from  to M() such that i(t) 2M(t) and t 2 wct(T (i(t))).
Su¢ ciency. Suppose (i) and (ii) hold. The following strategies constitute a sep-
arating equilibrium. Each type t sends i(t) (as considered in the formalization
of (ii)), to which R responds with aR(t) (injection i ensures that separation
holds). In addition, R responds to any message m with aR(t), where t is a
wci for T (m) ((i) =) wci(T (m)) 6= ?); so no type would have an incentive to
deviate.
Necessity. Suppose, contrary to the proposition, that there is a separating
equilibrium and either (i) or (ii) does not hold. First, suppose that (i) does
not hold: there is a message m 2 M() with wci(T (m)) = ?. Thus for each
t 2 co(T (m)), there is t 2 T (m) such that uS(aR(t); t) > uS(aR(t); t). Such
a type t would has an incentive to deviate to m 2 M(t) as, by supposition
his equilibrium message induces aR(t), a contradiction. Second, suppose that
(ii) does not hold. If there is a type t 2  who sends a message m 2 M(t),
certifying the set T (m) for which t is not a wct then, by denition, there is
a type t0 2 T (m) such that uS(aR(t); t0) > uS(aR(t0); t0). Such a type t0 would
then has an incentive to send m 2 M(t0), as by supposition his equilibrium
message induces aR(t0) while message m induces aR(t). If each type t sends
i(t) (as considered in the formalization of (ii)), but i is not an injection from
 to M() then there are two di¤erent types t1; t2 2  , with i(t1) = i(t2). So,
R cannot distinguish between t1 and t2. 
Determining whether a set has a wci may not be straightforward. The use of
the following lemma in the proof of Theorems 1 and 3 will allow us to simplify
the problem. A2 implies that the set of actions that a type t strictly prefers to
aR(t) write as the intersection between A and the open interval with endpoints
aR(t) and ~a(t). By denition of a wci t for T , aR(t) does not belong to this
set of actions. Lemma 1 simply says that action aR(t) is then out of the open
interval with endpoints aR(t) and ~a(t).
Lemma 1. If A2, then an inference t for T is a wci for T if and only if for
each t 2 T we have
[aR(t)  minfaR(t); ~a(t)g or aR(t)  maxfaR(t); ~a(t)g]:
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Proof of Lemma 1. Necessity. Let t be a wci for T . By denition, aR(t) 2 A
and for every t 2 T , we have uS(aR(t); t)  uS(aR(t); t). Let t 2 T . Let us
distinguish between three cases:
Case 1 : aR(t) < aS(t). By A2 and by denition of ~a(t), we rstly have aR(t) <
aS(t) < ~a(t), and secondly either aR(t)  aR(t) = minfaR(t); ~a(t)g or [~a(t) <
+1 and aR(t)  ~a(t) = maxfaR(t); ~a(t)g].
Case 2 : aR(t) > aS(t). An analogous argument to Case 1 allows us to conclude.
Case 3 : aR(t) = aS(t). By denition of ~a(t), we have minfaR(t); ~a(t)g =
maxfaR(t); ~a(t)g, which allows us to conclude.
Su¢ ciency. Let t 2 T and t 2 co(T ). Suppose aR(t)  minfaR(t); ~a(t)g.
From aR(t) 2 A which is a bounded set we obtain ~a(t) >  1. By denition
of ~a(t) and from A2, for every a 2 A, if a  minfaR(t); ~a(t)g then uS(a; t) 
uS(aR(t); t). In particular whenever a = aR(t). An analogous argument allows
us to conclude when aR(t)  maxfaR(t); ~a(t)g. 
Proof of Theorem 1. In order to establish existence of a separating equilib-
rium under A1, it su¢ ces to prove that Proposition 1 conditions (i) and (ii)
hold. A2 will allow us to use Lemma 1. Let us rst show that Proposition 1
condition (i) holds.
Suppose (a). Fix a certiable set T   . If B() does not change sign on T
then we either have ~a(t)  aS(t)  aR(t) 8t 2 T , or ~a(t)  aS(t)  aR(t)
8t 2 T . That is, by Lemma 1, either Tmin or Tmax is a wct as under A1 aR()
is increasing in t on  . If B() changes sign on T then there is an inference
t 2 co(T ) such that aS(t) = aR(t), as A1 and A2 imply that B() is contin-
uous in t on  . From (a), such a t can be chosen such that there is no pair
(t0; t") with t0 < t < t" satisfying B(t0) < 0 < B(t"). Using Lemma 1, it is
then easily checked that such a t is a wci for  and hence for T . Therefore,
Proposition 1 condition (i) holds.
Now, let us show that condition (ii) holds. Fix a type t 2  . Let us distinguish
between three cases:
Case 1 : There is a type t0 > t such that B(t0) > 0. From (b), type t can
certify a set T for which Tmax = t. By (a), for every t00 < t, B(t00)  0. So
~a(t00)  aR(t00)  aR(Tmax) = aR(t) as under A1 aR() is increasing in t on  .
By Lemma 1, t is then a wct for T .
Case 2 : There is a type t0 < t such that B(t0) < 0. By substituting Tmax for
Tmin, a similar argument to Case 1 applies.
Case 3 : There is neither t0 > t such that B(t0) > 0 nor t0 < t such that
B(t0) < 0. Thus, for every t0 > t we have aR(t0)  aS(t0). By denition of ~a(t0),
A2 implies that aR(t0)  aS(t0)  ~a(t0). So aR(t)  minfaR(t0); ~a(t0)g. Also,
for any type t00 < t, we obtain aR(t)  maxfaR(t0); ~a(t0)g. Under A2, Lemma
1 allows us to assert that t is a wct for  and then for any set he can certify.
Consequently, every type can certify a set for which he is a wct. From (b), the
possibly use of a di¤erent message to certify those sets implies Proposition 1
condition (ii) holds. 
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Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose contrary to the theorem, that T is a pooling
set in some equilibrium. As we are studying pure equilibria, dene aR(T ) as
argmaxa2A
R
T u
R(a; t)dp(t); under A1, aR(T ) is well-dened. If aR() is strictly
increasing in t then aR(Tmin) < aR(T ) < aR(Tmax). Condition (a) implies that
B(Tmin)  0 or B(Tmax)  0. So, whatever Rs equilibrium strategy, under A2
type Tmin or Tmax would strictly prefer to deviate by certifying a set as dened
in (b0) over certifying T , a contradiction. 
In the proof of Theorem 3, we shall use the following denitions. IfB() changes
sign nitely often, we shall say that t  (resp. t+) is the rst (resp. last) sign
change on T if it is the minimal (resp. maximal) zero t of B() on T which is
in a sign-changing interval in T , and such that [Tmin; t] (resp. [t; Tmax]) does
not contain a sign-changing interval.
Proof of Theorem 3. As in the proof of Theorem 1, under A1 and A2 it
su¢ ces to prove that the premises of Proposition 1 hold, using Lemma 1. We
shall start by proving the following lemma to show that conditions (a1) and
(a2) imply Proposition 1 condition (i).
Lemma 2. If A1 and A2 then any certiable set satisfying the single-crossing
property and on which B() changes sign nitely often has a wci.
Proof of Lemma 2. We shall use the following inductive argument.
Inductive Hypothesis. If every compact interval satisfying the single-crossing
property on which B() changes sign n times has a wci, then every compact in-
terval satisfying the single-crossing property on which B() changes sign n+1
times has a wci.
Proof. Let T   be a compact interval which satises the single-crossing
property. In the rst part of the proof of Theorem 1 we have shown that if
B() does not change sign on T then T has a wci. Let B() change sign n+ 1
times on T . Let us set t  (t+) as the rst (last) sign change on T . By deni-
tion, B() changes sign n times on [t ;Tmax] and on [Tmin; t+]. The Inductive
Hypothesis implies that each interval [t ;Tmax] and [Tmin; t+] has a wci. We
shall distinguish between three cases.
Case 1 : B(Tmin)  0. Let t 2 wci([t ;Tmax]). By denition of t , for all
t 2 [Tmin; t ] we have B(t)  0. So A1 and A2 imply that uS(aR(t); t) 
uS(aR(t); t). Hence t 2 wci(T ).
Case 2 : B(Tmax)  0. Analogously any wci for the interval [Tmin; t+] is a wci
for T .
Case 3 : B(Tmin) < 0 < B(Tmax). We proceed by contradiction. Suppose
that T has no wci. Let t 2 wci([Tmin; t+]). By Lemma 1, there is a type
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t1 2 [t+;Tmax] such that ~a(t1) < aR(t) < aR(t1). As B()  0 on [t+;Tmax]
and Tmax is not a wci for T , by Lemma 1, there is a type t2 2 [Tmin; t+] such that
aR(t2) < a
R(Tmax) < ~a(t2). As t 2 wci([Tmin; t+]), we have aR(t)  aR(t2).
Thus, ~a(t1) < aR(t)  aR(t2)  aR(t1)  aR(Tmax) < ~a(t2). We again shall
distinguish between two cases.
Case 3.1 : aR(t2) < aR(t1). Hence, from the previous inequality t1 and t2 vio-
lates the single-crossing property, a contradiction.
Case 3.2 : aR(t2) = aR(t1). As t1 is not a wci for T , by Lemma 1, there either
is t3 2 [t1;Tmax] such that ~a(t3) < aR(t1) < aR(t3) or t4 2 [Tmin; t1] such that
aR(t4) < a
R(t1) < ~a(t4). So, we either have ~a(t3) < aR(t2) = aR(t1) < aR(t3) 
aR(Tmax) < ~a(t2) or ~a(t1) < aR(t)  aR(t4) < aR(t1) < ~a(t4). Hence, either
(t2 and t3) or (t1 and t4) violates the single-crossing property, a contradiction.

Theorem 1 and the Inductive Hypothesis then imply Lemma 2. 
To conclude, notice that conditions (a1) excludes the possibility that any cer-
tiable set contains a pair of types strictly preferring to be misidentied for
another. While condition (b0) states that every type can certify, by sending a
di¤erent message, a set which only contains types inducing the same Rs ideal
action or for which he strictly prefers to be misidentied. Therefore, conditions
(a1) and (b0) imply Proposition 1 condition (ii). 
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